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Abstract 
When the EU and South Africa acceded to a strategic partnership, they expanded into 
new areas of partnership. One of these areas was peace and security, which is the 
focus of this article. The article argues that although there appears to be a shared 
understanding of what security means, the strategic partnership has not been utilised 
signifiFDQWO\WRIXUWKHUWKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJLQSUDFWLFH7KLVLVODUJHO\GXHWRWKH(8¶V
preferences for a continental, multilateral approach over the bilateralism of a strategic 
partnership. At the same time, South Africa sees its strategic partnership with the EU 
as being outside of its broader commitment to regional security. As a result the peace 
and security element of the strategic partnership has not been leveraged effectively 
despite several entry points for action. The article thus concludes that both the EU and 
South Africa need to re-think the current arrangement. 
Introduction 
This article examines how notions of security in the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) and now the Global Security Strategy have interacted with the development of 
µSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRI(8-South Africa relations in the past decade of 
the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership. To do this, the article addresses first the 
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GHYHORSPHQWRIWKH(8¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK6RXWK$IULFDIt then demonstrates how the 
construction of South Africa, in particular its post 1994 identity, is externalised and 
situated vis-à-vis the rest of Africa.1 This post 1994 identity has played a role in what 
the article argues is the discursive exclusion of peace and security in the strategic 
partnership with the EU. This exclusion within the partnership is however not a 
complete exclusion of peace and security within the broader remit of EU-South Africa 
(EU-6$ UHODWLRQV 5DWKHU LQ RUGHU WR µVHH¶ SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\ ZKHUH WKH (8 DQG
South Africa are concerned, the argument is that it is necessary to look to the practice 
of security by the EU at the regional/continental level.  
 
This preference for regional/continental security cooperation and practice can be 
explained by how the EU sees itself and the way it has constructed security as part of 
its international relations. This self-understanding informs the practice of security in 
the EUs engagement with South Africa and Africa more broadly on peace and 
security. Following an examination of how the EU enacts peace and security, the 
article highlights some potential areas of cooperation between the two strategic 
partners. In analysing whether, and the extent to which, the strategic partnership is 
used to enhance regional security, the article concludes with some reflections on what 
limited partnership in this area might mean for the future of the EU-South Africa 
Strategic Partnership on peace and security. 
 
Before delving into the main analysis, it is worth considering the data collection and 
analysis methods used. The arguments made here and the analysis developed relies on 
a qualitative approach to research that includes process tracing and broad discourse 
analysis as methods. Process tracing is applied to official documents, press releases, 
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academic literature and third party reports. These sources create causal chains that 
help to organise data systematically. This allows for ease in identifying nodal points, 
each one µD SULYLOHJHG VLJQ DURXQG ZKLFK the RWKHU VLJQV DUH RUGHUHG¶2. Utilising 
discourse analysis, this article seeks to understand these nodal points better.  
 
In other words, the analysis within this article identifies the ways in which the 
meaning of EU-SA relations are fixed as unique, and consequently what implications 
this has in relation to peace and security in the context of the last decade of the 
strategic partnership. By undertaking discourse analysis, this assessment gives equal 
worth to text and speech as research sources, while providing insights into specific 
practices in EU-SA relations since the establishment of their strategic partnership, as 
well as some unintended consequences within this unique context.  
 
Peace and Security ± a discursive exclusion 
 
In 2007, the European Union (EU) and South Africa signed a strategic partnership. 
This has already been identified as significant, with the recurring refrain that this is 
the only strategic partnership the EU has with an African country. This accession to 
the level of strategic partnership appears a seemingly monumental shift in relations 
between the two polities. However, the terms of the partnership, as articulated in the 
formal agreement, emphasised that the partnership was predicated on prior relations 
in trade, development, and science and technology innovations. 
 
Importantly, however, the partnership framework also laid the groundwork for 
expanding on additional areas of cooperation and engagement. Here, there are new 
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commitments to transnational social issues, including the environment and 
information and communications technology (ICT), and an enthusiasm for more joint 
foreign policy positions especially through multilateral practice in trade, international 
crime and regional integration. At the time that the EU and South Africa signed the 
partnership, however, peace and security was deemed, along with other areas of 
cooperation, WREHDVSLUDWLRQDOFRQWUDU\WRWKH(8¶VEURDGHUHQJDJHPHQWLQWKHUHVWRI
Africa.  
 
South Africa, like the North African countries,3 was often seen as outside the core 
focus of Africa-EU relations during the Cold War. South Africa was typically 
excluded from Africa-EU relations owing to its apartheid system of governance, 
normatively and ethically rejected by an ostensibly post-colonial European 
Community. This has meant that unlike its engagement with the African countries in 
the context of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) trans-regional bloc, 
historically EU-South Africa relations were positioned as unique. 
 
This material and discursive construction of a South Africa unique in Africa and in 
international relations is reproduced by South African elites, accepted by the EU and 
made visible in the official agreements. In short, the way that South Africa narrates 
itself in terms of its material capabilities and various policy discourses suggests a 
country that is set apart from the rest in the African context and, consequently, in its 
foreign policies. When the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) 
was first established between the EU and South Africa, the sharp separation of South 
Africa from the rest of the Africa-EU context further crystallised the notion that South 
Africa was different. South Africa, just a few years officially out of apartheid, chose 
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not to negotiate development cooperation, political dialogue or trade through the 
typical Africa-EU framework of ACP agreements.  
 
This was a deliberate strategy; after all, South Africa actually acceded to the 
Georgetown Agreement between the ACP countries in 1997. And although it did not 
fully come into force until 2004, the TDCA was signed in 1999, two years after 
Pretoria began its official membership in the ACP-EU relations. Yet, an official 
statement about membership in the ACP declares WKDWµ>6RXth Africa] is not a party to 
the trade chapters of the Cotonou Agreement because South Africa already had an 
DJUHHPHQW ZLWK WKH (8¶.4 Thus, while South Africa sees the ACP as a forum to 
negotiate with other developing countries, it was not the vehicle of choice for 
3UHWRULD¶Vengagement with the EU. The subsequent negotiation and accession to the 
EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, the only such bi-lateral relationship the EU 
has with a single country in Africa, further underscores the narrative of South Africa 
as different, distinct or unique.   
 
This separation from the rest of the continent has had concrete implications, one of 
which is the exclusion of a tangible joint peace and security agenda in the context of 
the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership. The longevity of the relationship between 
the EU and South Africa means that South Africa is also witness to, and catalyst for 
the broader evolution of Africa-EU relations, and importantly the development of the 
(8¶VFDSDELOLWLHVDVDJOREDODFWRU5. Moreover, the inclusion of peace and security as 
an area of cooperation with Africa constitutes an extension of the post 1994 
relationship between the EU and South Africa. It is thus not surprising that the EU has 
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had a preference for engaging in security with specific states or at the regional-
continental level. 
 
The argument here is that because of the evolution of the relationship between the EU 
and South Africa, peace and security cooperation is substantively excluded from the 
EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership. Its mention within the documentation of the 
strategic partnership suggests a tendency towards the inter-texuality6 on peace and 
security found in the numerous texts that account for the EUs external relations, 
especially towards Africa. The first and most prominent of these is the European 
Security Strategy of 2003. In consideration of the ESS, it is argued that the unique 
history of EU-South Africa relations bears responsibility for the lack of development 
of the peace and security area of cooperation within the strategic partnership. 
Although a new space had been created for more than just trade and aid, including 
increased political dialogue, the discursive absence of peace and security beyond 
mention as a substantive area of cooperation has been notable in the first decade of 
the partnership. This absence has not been an exercise in deception. Rather, it is the 
direct consequence of a relationship that builds on a specific history of interactions, 
RQ WKH(8¶VEURDGHUDSSURDFK WR$IULFD DQGRQ6RXWK$IULFD¶V VHOI-perception as a 
security actor.7  
 
The discursive exclusion of peace and security from the strategic partnership 
however, does not translate into its exclusion in EU-South Africa relations. Rather, 
6RXWK $IULFD OLNH WKH RWKHU VWUDWHJLF SDUWQHUV SOD\V D UROH LQ VKDSLQJ WKH (8¶V
perceptions of what constitutes insecurity and the global challenge this presents. 
However, due to its own internal dynamics and the evolution of its relationship with 
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the rest of the African continent, the EU situates the importance of South Africa as 
relevant within a complex regional security landscape that requires multilateral 
responses.  
 
If one accepts this understanding of EU-SA relations (and within those relations, the 
strategic partnership), and of Africa-EU relations, then a more nuanced understanding 
of the position of peace and security begins to emerge. To gain a full understanding it 
is most fruitful to look outside of the strategic partnership, turning to practices at the 
regional/continental level. In doing so, it is then possible to identify the evolution of 
WKH(8¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVHFXULW\DVSDUWRILWVUHJLRQDOLGHQWLW\DQGLWVSUHIHUHQFHIRU
particular priorities in security practice by drawing on the experiential and normative 
dimensions of security.  
 
Constructing the EU in Africa: An extra-regionalist case for human security  
 
7KH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW IRU WKH (8¶V HQJDJHPHQW LQ $IULFD LV WKH (66 7KURXJK WKLV
framework, the EU articulates its normative responsibility to promote a world that 
HQMR\V SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\ 7KH (8¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI VHFXULW\ LV WKXV H[SHULHQWLDO
7KHUHIRUH µSHDFH DQG VHFXULW\¶ LV FRQFHSWXDOised as not just a national good, as is 
typical of states in their practise of international relations, but a regional one. 
 
Regional approaches to political practices are well grounded within the Areas Studies 
and International Relations literature. Regionalism refers to strategic coordination and 
cooperation within a given region. 8  This does not exclude national preference or 
action. Rather, it reflects the institutionalisation of certain discursive and material 
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SUDFWLFHVWKDWDOORZXVWRVSHDNRIµWKH(8¶DVDVHFXULW\DFWRURQWKHRQHKDQGEXW
that also help us to understand the national policies of South Africa that make the 
African region a focus of its foreign policy identity. 
 
International Relations theories offer competing explanations for why regional 
security cooperation happens.  For neo-realists, the pressures of certain security 
µWKUHDWV¶ DOORZ VWDWHV WR FRPH WRJHWKHU LQ UHVSRQVH WR WKH WKUHDW9 In other words, 
security cooperation is based on the relative interests of the states and is only 
sustained as long as that interest remains. Some critical security theorists suggest 
other explanations through the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).10 RSCT 
was conceptualised by Barry Buzan and further developed with Ole Waever as part of 
the broad theorising of the Copenhagen School approach to security.11 They argue 
that trends in international security practice are increasingly regionalised. This is due 
to both the nature of security threats, and the responses to these threats, which are 
constrained from travelling over long distances. While RSCT conclusions on the 
nature of insecurity are downright problematic, especially with respect to its portrayal 
of the subaltern, RSCT represents some theoretical and empirical justifications for 
notions of security as regional. 
 
It makes sense, then, that thH(8¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVHFXULW\LVinformed by its self-
identity as a regional entity. This is especially based on the perception that a regional 
approach has guaranteed security for Europe and thus, this is a perspective that the 
EU seeks to export.12 In other words, it aims to conduct its foreign security relations 
at the regional level. This is the practice that has been observed in EU engagements 
on security in Africa.  The result is that even in its bilateral relationships in Africa, 
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including its strategic partnership with South Africa,, peace and security cooperation 
is conducted within this lens. Its explicit function is to enhance the regional 
dimensions of security.  
 
2YHUDOO WKLV YLVLRQ DSSHDUV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 6RXWK $IULFD¶V RZQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\
rhetoric. While South Africa itself does not have a singular national security policy, 
across a variety of key documents such a framework begins to emerge. 
 
In 1994, the White Paper on Intelligence ZKLFK VHWV WKH WRQH IRU 6RXWK $IULFD¶V
security vision stated: 13 
 
The intermingling and transnational character of modern-day security issues 
furthermore indicates that solutions to the problems of insecurity are beyond 
the direct control of any single country  
In the 2011 :KLWH3DSHURQ6RXWK$IULFD¶V)RUHLJQPolicy, the following is noted: 14 
 
Our struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with our pursuit of 
a better Africa in a better world. Its destiny is inextricably linked to that of the 
Southern African region. Regional and continental integration is the 
IRXQGDWLRQIRU$IULFD¶VVRFLR-economic development and political unity, and 
essential for our own prosperity and security. 
 
 
Moreover, its 2014 National Defence Review clearly articulates these responses as 
being regional. The document states: 15  
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South African national security inextricably hinges on the stability, unity and 
prosperity of the Southern African region, and the African continent in 
JHQHUDO$IULFDLVDWWKHFHQWUHRI6RXWK$IULFDQSROLF\« 
 
The 2003 ESS, from the onset, sets Africa in the EUs VLJKWV IRU µGRLQJ¶ VHFXULW\
Following a description of the crippling power vacuum experienced in many countries 
of the world, and the impact of AIDs on different societies, the ESS states specifically 
that, 16   
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, 
economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict. 
Security is a precondition of development.  
 
Here, the EU sets the tone for how it understands responses to insecurity as a link 
between traditionally divergent areas. What is further striking is that whereas five 
distinct threats where identified, only one of them is positioned as being linked or 
triggering the others. This is regional conflict. The ESS states: 17 
 
Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides 
opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the 
demand for [weapons of mass destruction]. The most practical way to 
tackle the often-elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the 
older problems of regional conflict. 
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In taking a regional approach to security, states create an opening for the combining 
of traditional security and economic issues, given the politics of regionalisation itself. 
Specifically, the idea that conflict has destructive implications for development is not 
surprising, and indeed a statement of fact.18 The so-called security-development nexus 
is now well recognised in global policymaking discourses.19  
 
,Q6RXWK$IULFD¶VNational Defence Review, which further reinforces the ESS 
approach, we find the following statement: 20 
 
>«@VHFXULW\DQGGHYHORSPHQWJRKDQG LQKDQG WKH WZRDUH LQWHU-linked and 
LQWHUWZLQHGDQGERWKDUHWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VELJJHVWFKDOOHQJHV6RXWK$IULFD LQ
partnership with likeminded African states, has a vested interest in 
contributing to the rooting of democracy, the promotion of economic 
advancement and the pursuit of peace, stability and development on the 
African continent. 
 
The 1994 White Paper on Intelligence similarly notes: 21 
 
[Insecurity] cannot be rectified by purely military means. The international 
security agenda is shifting to the full range of political, economic, military, 
social, religious, technological, ethnic and ethical factors that shape security 
issues around the world. The main threat to the wellbeing of individuals and 
the interests of nations across the world does not primarily come from a 
neighbouring army, but from other internal and external challenges such as 
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economic collapse, overpopulation, mass-migration, ethnic rivalry, political 
oppression, terrorism, crime and disease, to mention but a few. 
 
Discursively then, there is a common vision of the components of peace and security 
between the EU and South Africa. At the very least this justifies thH µPHQWLRQ¶ RI
peace and security in the strategic partnership. In other words, this is the spirit in 
ZKLFKµSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\¶DSSHDUVZLWKLQWKHVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLS2IFRXUVHWKLVLV
not to suggest that this linkage between security and development itself is uncontested 
or that it is executed to the best ethical standards and benefits of those deemed 
insecure. As Stern and Öjendal have identified, those who adopt the security-
development nexus frame have not adequately captured the imbued meaning and use 
of this widely accepted concept.22      
 
In identifying security as a precondition for development, EU policy, as articulated by 
the ESS, is further explicit about its prioritisation of regional responses to insecurity. 
The ESS for example states that regional organisations like the AU are important for 
µD PRUH RUGHUO\ ZRUOG¶23 7KLV IXUWKHU XQGHUVFRUHV WKH (8¶V QRUPDWLYH DSSURDFK WR
tackling insecurity through regional approaches. This of course means that 
meaningful engagement in the area of peace and security must in part appear to accept 
this normative frame. Indeed, following the 13th Ministerial Dialogue between the EU 
and South Africa (2016), the official record of the meeting ± a joint press release ± 
addresses peace and security only within the context of regional cooperation. 
6SHFLILFDOO\ LWHP  WLWOHG 5HJLRQDO &RRSHUDWLRQ VWDWHV µ6RXWK $IULFD DQG WKH
European Union agreed to continue co-operation on peace and security in the 
FRQWLQHQW¶24 
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This is important because, while the strategic partnership does not elaborate 
significantly on peace and security, it allows the space for dialogue while emphasising 
its continental/regional relevance rather than a national one. The press release 
continues: 25 
 
6RXWK $IULFD ZHOFRPHG WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V VLJQLILcant political and 
financial support to the African Peace and Security Architecture as a means to 
deliver African solutions to African problems. 
 
The promotion of peace and security, as an explicit area of cooperation at the 
continental/regional level, datHVEDFNWRWKHHDUO\V7KH(8¶VRZQHQJDJHPHQW
LQDUHDVRIWUDGLWLRQDOVHFXULW\DFWXDOO\GDWHVEDFNWRWKURXJKWKH(8¶VPLOLWDU\
mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Operation ARTEMIS. This 
early period also coincided with the transition of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) to the African Union (AU). At this time, AU leaders also asked the EU to  
finance the African Peace Facility funding mechanism for the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA).26 In 2007, peace and security became an explicit area 
of cooperation and perhaps the most important element of Africa-EU relations, 
through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). 7KURXJK WKH -$(6 WKH (8¶V VHFXULW\
engagement on the continent was reinforced as a regional concern; the involvement of 
the EU as the µextra-regional¶ actor makes security truly inter-regional,27 challenging 
the RSCT logic to an extent. Importantly however, the AU (whose member states 
LQFOXGH6RXWK$IULFDEHFRPHV WKHNH\ LQWHUORFXWRU IRU WKH(8¶VSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\
aspirations in Africa.  
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Security in this frame then has a specific meaning. Security, understood within this 
PRWLYDWLRQ WR µGRVRPHWKLQJ¶ WKDW HIIHFWLYHO\ HQVXUHV WKH UHDOLVDWLRQRI VHFXULW\ DQG
development, is worthy of some reflection. Having shown that regions matter in 
understanding security dynamics, and that commitments to ensuring security and 
development positively reinforce each other, what exactly is security?  
 
What security means in the context of what some refer to as the µVHFXULW\-
GHYHORSPHQWQH[XV¶GRHVQRW H[LVW RXWVLGHRI WKHPHDQLQJV DWWDFKHG WR WKH term by 
practice. Stern and Ojendal effectively map several narratives.28 In reviewing the ESS 
(2003), its review (2008), and the recent Global Security Strategy (2016), it is fair to 
argue that the EU conceives of security through a human security lens. The decision 
to ascribe human security to the EU comes from the Barcelona Report29 of the Human 
Security Study Group,30 created by the former EU High Representative Javier Solana. 
In the report, its authors propose that the EU adopt human security as a strategic 
doctrine of the EU. This recommendation invoked the commitment of the ESS. It 
focuses on the implications of EU security practice in instances of humanitarian 
emergencies and political violence. In addition to emphasising the primacy of human 
ULJKWV LQ VHFXULW\ SUDFWLFH WKH %DUFHORQD 5HSRUW DOVR UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW WKH (8¶V
approach be regionally focused, with emphasis on multilateralism and partnership 
ZLWKµORFDOV¶31 
 
In a follow up report that presented a path towards implementation of the doctrine, the 
study group argued that: 32  
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Human Security has the potential to operate as a dynamic organising frame, 
which could give new direction and coherence to European efforts to address 
the challenges set out in the European Security Strategy. 
 
Moreover human security is invoked as morally right. It is further defined to mean 33 
 
>«@individual freedom from basic insecurities. [These include] genocide, 
wide-spread [sic] or systematic torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
disappearances, slavery, and crimes against humanity and grave violations of 
WKHODZVRIZDU« 
 
This definition is similar to definitions used in the African regional context. For 
example, the African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact defends an African 
vision embedded in a notion of human security, defined as: 34   
 
.the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It 
also includes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and 
cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the 
protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee 
for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development. 
 
The 2011 :KLWH3DSHURQ6RXWK$IULFD¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\ also notes that: 35 
national security would >«@ depend on the centrality of human security as a 
universal goal, based on the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first). 
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Moreover, South African scholars Cheryl Hendricks 36  and Jakkie Cillers 37  have 
argued convincingly that, with reference to South Africa specifically, human security 
is the frame for security that takes the region as the site of its foreign security policies. 
It is worth noting that while there is no consensus among scholars on the definition of 
human security,38 the narrative of security that includes different threats and referents 
beyond the state captures this approach. The EU appURDFKIXUWKHUVWDWHVWKDWµPDVVLYH
violations of the right to food, health and housing may also be considered in this 
FDWHJRU\DOWKRXJKWKHLUOHJDOVWDWXVLVOHVVHOHYDWHG¶DQGOLNHWKH$IULFDQRQHµRIIHUV
a language for addressing different experiencHV RI LQVHFXULW\¶39 In addition to the 
links made between traditional security concerns and areas usually framed as 
GHYHORSPHQW WKH (8¶V WDNH RQ KXPDQ VHFXULW\ UHIOHFWV LWV UHJLRQDO DQG H[WUD-
UHJLRQDO DVSLUDWLRQV 7KH 0DGULG 5HSRUW MXVWLILHV WKH (8¶V normative security 
aspirations in this way: 40 
 
A human security approach for the European Union means that it should 
contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus 
RQO\RQ WKHGHIHQFHRI WKH8QLRQ¶VERUGHUVDVZDV WKHVHFXULW\ approach of 
nation-states. 
 
We thus see how human security can be used as a framework for regional security 
practice within the security-development nexus. The security-development nexus that 
draws on human security is what Stern and Ojendal refer to as a µGHHSHQHGEURDGHQHG
DQG KXPDQLVHG¶ 41  notion of security. It is an alternative narrative to state-based 
deterministic security, making it fitting for a range of regional insecurities.  It is able 
WR µDWWHQG WR WKH ORFDOLVHG H[SHULHQFHV IHDUV GHVLUHV QHHGV HWF RI YXOQHUDEOH
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SHRSOHV¶42 At the regional and national levels in both the EU and South Africa, this is 
indeed the discursive aspiration for peace and security.  
 
However, given the substantive exclusion of peace and security in the strategic 
partnership, it is worth questioning what a joint vision on peace and security means in 
practice. In particular, to what extent do these understandings of security inform the 
(8¶V SUDFWLFH RI VHFXULW\ LQ 6RXWK $IULFD" :KDW DUH WKH RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU
collaboration and to what extent do they occur?  
 
Thus, to answer the above questions, the subsequent section explores three areas of 
responses to insecurity in which the EU has demonstrated interest and practice, and 
DWWHPSWVWRµILQG¶6RXWK$IULFDZLWKLQthem. Specifically, these are areas that both the 
EU and South Africa have exhibited knowledge of, have articulated as important, and 
in which there is convergence. These areas include: capacity building, crisis 
management, and the promotion of gender equality as an intersecting security priority.  
 
Capacity building through institution building  
The support of the EU for capacity building initiatives in the African security context 
was first articulated in the first action plan of the JAES.  In addition to supporting the 
establishment of a predictable funding source for peace support operations, the EU 
made a commitment to enhance dialogue on peace and security challenges and fully 
operationalise all aspects of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In 
the years since the establishment of the JAES, the EU has remained a significant actor 
in developing the capabilities of the APSA. 43  
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This regional context is important because the EU has given no indication that peace 
and security within the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership has deviated from this 
primary priority. This has seen the EU and its member states focused on being the 
largest financial contributors to the APSA. As noted above,  the EU, through the 
African Peace Facility (APF), finances this AU organ. The majority of the funding 
WKDWJRHVWRZDUGV$IULFD¶VSHDFHVXSSRUWRSHUDWLRQVLQWKHODVWGHFDGHKDVFRPHIURP
this scheme.  
 
Nevertheless, without South Africa (along with Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and Nigeria), 
the APSA itself would not exist as an ambitious framework for tackling the regions 
many security challenges. For example, the research by van Nieuwkerk shows the 
former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, acted as an important norm 
entrepreneur among other members of the AU in lobbying for the creation of a strong 
architecture. 44  Rhetorically, South African foreign policy is premised on 
unconditional support for the APSA, and therefore the EU, in its support of the 
institution. This is further evident in the specific context of the strategic partnership 
where the development of the APSA was the subject of peace and security 
cooperation in the last EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership summit.45 
 
However, the substantive content of the promotion of a regional approach within the 
strategic partnership is perhaps most tangible in the creation of its dialogue facility. 
The area where the strategic partnership has been useful is in enhancing dialogue; as 
part of structures borne out of the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, the 
'LDORJXH )DFLOLW\ ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG WR µraise awareness of the special relationship 
EHWZHHQWKH(8DQG6$¶46 7KLVVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSLVXVHGWRVXSSRUWµGLDORJXHDQG
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cooperation in bilateral, regional, African and global matters between the Government 
RI6$DQGWKH(8DQGLWV0HPEHU6WDWHV¶47  
 
The Dialogue Facility has provided the support to negotiations that bring together 
formal representatives of governments in Africa, the EU and indeed civil society 
organisations. Most recently, this has been the space for bringing together different 
views on how to bring peace and justice to Burundi.48At a workshop hosted by the 
South African Liaison Office (SALO), under the auspices of the Dialogue Facility, a 
range of stakeholders including official representatives of the Burundian government, 
ZRPHQ¶VJURXSVFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLves of other international 
institutions shared their views about the crisis in Burundi. 49  In this example, the 
substantive impact of the Dialogue Facility, however, relied on the work of other 
actors outside of the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, given the regional 
dynamics of the Burundi conflict. Consequently, to enact this dimension of the 
strategic partnership itself, the region must remain a priority.  
 
In the commitment to capacity building for peace and security in Africa, there are 
some areas of overlaps in EU and South Africa perspectives. Specifically it is in the 
area of dialogue that the strategic partnership has been utilised. Arguably, this is the 
case because it provides the space for dialogue and it is relatively benign compared to 
typical hard security areas. It is a forum through which the discourse of the security-
development nexus and human security can be articulated. In this area, South Africa 
has the opportunity to shine without incurring negative feedback about its preferences 
for bilateralism. At the same time, the EU is able to use the strategic partnership as a 
part of its broader strategy for promoting regionalism in its external relations. 
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Whereas the creation of the Dialogue Facility can be measured as a positive outcome 
of the strategic partnership, its work as an instrument of peace and security on the 
continent is one of many.  
 
Leveraging the strategic partnership in crisis management? 
 
Unlike states or the United Nations (UN), the EU does not have autonomous military 
capabilities and many of its member states have a preference for keeping their assets 
under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Yet, the EU 
has been active in crisis management and especially in Africa through its Common 
6HFXULW\DQG'HIHQFH3ROLF\&6'3ZKHUHLWUHOLHVRQWKHJRRGZLOORIµORFDOV¶ 
 
The CSDP is a key component of European peace and security architecture. In its 
external duties, the EU through the CSDP (and the European Security and Defence 
Policy before it) places emphasis on both military and civilian conflict prevention, 
crisis management and peacebuilding. The EU aims to use a range of tools to address 
incidents of insecurity within and beyond Europe. Since 2003, the EU has actively 
supported or participated in peace support missions ranging from military 
[intervention], support or assistance, rule of law, monitoring, border or police 
missions. The EU especially remains heavily invested in the DRC since its first 
military mission there in 2003, codenamed Operation ARTEMIS.50  
 
Operation ARTEMIS was deployed in the summer of 2003 as a humanitarian military 
mission to the Bunia area of the DRC. It was a direct response to the many years of 
political violence, and specifically to the escalated violence between militias in Bunia. 
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$57(0,6 ZDV GHSOR\HG DV SDUW RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶s response to this 
crisis as an interim emergency multinational force (IEMF) instigated by France. It is 
in this mission that the potential advantages of an EU-South Africa strategic 
partnership on peace and security are first evident. South Africa was the only African 
country to contribute directly to an ESDP mission and one of only three non-EU 
states.51 Of course the 2003 operation predates the formal strategic partnership. Still, 
its spirit was very much present when Catherine Ashton, former EU high 
representative for foreign and security policy, supported by new powers in the Lisbon 
Treaty, EHJDQQHJRWLDWLQJ WR IRUPDOLVHZLWK µWKLUG¶FRXQWULHV LQFOXGLQJ6RXWK$IULFD
an agreement that would allow external participation in CSDP missions. 52  South 
Africa and Morocco would have been the only African countries engaged in direct EU 
CSDP missions. Thus, what ARTEMIS did was create a context for a strategic 
partnership in traditional practices of peace and security between the EU and South 
Africa. 
 
From the perspecWLYHRI WKH(86RXWK$IULFD¶V ORQJ-standing role in peace support 
operations in Africa and as regional security actor is advantageous to its own aims of 
peace and security on the continent.53 To use the strategic partnership as the basis for 
crisis management provides the opportunity to underscore that normative commitment 
of both actors to a specific understanding of security. Furthermore, it allows the EU to 
fulfil its commitments to promoting the local ownership of peace and security 
processes.  
 
However, since ARTEMIS, and despite the development of the strategic partnership, 
there has not been a move to deepen EU-South Africa engagements on crisis 
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management. Indeed, when the EU thinks of a crisis management partner in Africa, 
the AU remains the preferred choice.54  7KXV ZKLOH 6RXWK $IULFD¶V H[SHULHQFH LQ
regional and military crisis management is valued, presently, it is through the AU that 
the EU envisions its contributions.  
 
From the above two examples, there are clear challenges inherent in channelling 
specific areas of security through the strategic partnership itself. But is this the same 
story when investigating new normative frameworks associated with the kind of 
security promulgated by the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership? In answering this 
the following section examines the promotion of the Women Peace and Security 
Agenda by the EU and what it has meant in the context of the strategic partnership.  
 
The Women, Peace and Security Agenda: An avenue for gender equality 
promotion? 
Many scholars have identified that the EU views itself as a gender equal actor across 
all its policy domains.55 While not always successful in adhering to practices that 
ensure equality, this narrative of the EU as a gender equal actor forms a fundamental 
core of its UHJLRQDO LGHQWLW\ ,QGHHG WKH (8 KDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ HQGRUVHG WKH 81¶V
gender equality framework on peace and security, the Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS) Agenda.  
 
The WPS Agenda was established through an initial UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1325 in 2000. The subsequent 7 resolutions that make up the framework 
FRQVWLWXWHµan innovative tool-ER[WROHYHUDJHPRUHHTXLWDEOHSHDFH¶56 7KH:RPHQ¶V
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) defines WPS thus: 57 
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This Agenda has transformative potential - the potential to escape cycles of 
conflict, to create inclusive and more democratic peacemaking and to turn 
IURP JHQGHU LQHTXDOLW\ WR JHQGHU MXVWLFH :RPHQ¶V DJHQF\ YRLFH DQG
capacities are critical to local dialogues, better policies and more equitable 
peace deals. 
 
In other words, the WPS aspires to a peaceful system that caters to all humans, values 
rights and demands justice. 
 
In a 2016 speech WR WKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO WKH(8¶V6SHFLDO$GYLVHURQ Gender 
and the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security Mara Marinaki highlighted four 
priorities of the EU in implementing the WPS Agenda. These were improving 
ZRPHQ¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG OHDGHUVKLS LQ SHDFH PLVVLRQV FRPEDWWLQJ VH[XDO DQG
gender based violence in conflict; integrating gender perspectives into the work 
against terrorism and violent extremism; and finally strengthening cooperative 
frameworks. 58  This last priority is especially pertinent to understanding the 
opportunities inherent in promoting the WPS Agenda within the EU-South Africa 
Strategic Partnership. 
 
The desire to ensure a multilateral approach to implementing the WPS Agenda should 
make the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership a good fit for implementing the 
framework. The EU views third parties as essential to its own role in promoting (and 
implementing) the WPS Agenda. In a 2014 report of the Council of the European 
Author Accepted Manuscript for Publication 31 May 2017 in South African Journal of 
International Affairs 
 24 
Union, endorsed by the member states through the political and security committee, 
WKH(8¶VSRVLWLRQwas made clear: 59 
 
Keeping the issue of women, peace and security high on the international 
agenda is an important role of the EU. Tangible results can only be achieved 
through co-operation among international and regional organisations 
(particularly the United Nations, NATO, African Union, OSCE, etc.) and 
other actors. The EU encourages operational co-operation and strategic 
partnerships, as well as information sharing, training and co-operation on the 
ground. This collaboration between third countries, Member States, and other 
international organisations is vital to progress on the matter of women, peace 
and security. 
 
In the foregoing, however, it is important to pay extra attention to the utility of 
language and its inadvertent narrative. The EU makes allowance for instituting 
strategic partnerships for the specific purpose of implementing the WPS Agenda; but 
it only names other regional and international organisations as partners. Third 
countries feature as generic. WPS here is thus not prioritised as a space for 
engagement within existing strategic partnerships but rather a site for forging new and 
specific strategic partnerships.  
 
Moreover, while both the EU and South Africa subscribe to this normative 
framework, gender concerns have not featured as an integral part of public utterances 
on peace and security cooperation within the strategic partnership. For example, 
although the strategic partnership was signed seven years after UNSCR 1325 was 
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enacted, the only reference to gender (mainstreaming), the first action plan, is in the 
areas of employment and youth and social work. On the one hand this might reflect a 
superficial commitment to the WPS agenda on the part of both partners. On the other, 
as scholars of EU foreign policy have argued,60 this is simply another indication of the 
(8¶VODFNOXVWUHUHFRUGRQLPSOHPHQWLQJWKH:36Agenda. It is perhaps unsurprising 
then that in the strategic partnership this is hardly mentioned. Yet, what is interesting 
is that the WPS Agenda features very prominently in the context of the work the EU 
does at the continental level. Indeed, the JAES features the implementation of the 
agenda as a priority goal of peace and security cooperation61. 
 
By examining three different areas where the EU has had the opportunity to leverage 
its strategic partnership with South Africa and fulfil its own regional security 
imperative this article presents a comprehensive view of EU peace and security 
capabilities. Yet, the dominant narrative that emerges from this analysis is that this 
unique relationship is rarely used coherently. The EU continues to have a preference 
for channelling its regional security partnership in Africa primarily through other 
partners like the Africa Union, despite the opportunities available. The extent, then, to 
which a strategic partnership on peace on security actually exists is questionable. 
Moreover, the current state of affairs potentially creates some JDSVLQWKH(8¶VDELOLW\
to be a successful security actor in Africa. 
 
Conclusion: Exploring the Unintended Consequences  
,QWRGD\¶VUDSLGO\HYROYLQJVHFXULW\ODQGVFDSHSHRSOHVWDWHVUHJLRQVDQGLQGHHGWKH
global order is confronted with a host of challenges. In Africa, conflict is a main 
challenge to peace and prosperity, while everyday insecurities like gender inequality 
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and poverty further entrench the constraints on security. In Europe, existing and 
SRWHQWLDO FRQIOLFWV LQ WKH (8¶V HDVWHUQ QHLJKERXUKRod, the self-LQIOLFWHG µPLJUDWLRQ
FULVLV¶ WHUURULVW DWWDFNV DQG GRPHVWLFDOO\ WKH ULVH RI ULJKW ZLQJ SRSXOLVP DPRQJ
other dynamicss, pose significant challenges for the role of the EU as an international 
security actor. Yet there is clear acknowledgement and evidence that many of these 
challenges are sources of concerns for both South Africa and the EU. They are thus 
opportunities for cooperation. 
 
In this context, it is unsurprising that the EU remains the premier extra-regional actor 
on the African continent. To do this it relies on many entities, especially in its goals to 
combine security and development and ultimately effect human security regionally. 
Given the strategic partnership with South Africa, one would expect the EU to 
leverage the relationship to meet its goals. However, its choice to not use an existing 
strategic partnership, strategically, is puzzling.   
 
As the second section of this article shows, security cooperation is viewed as an 
extension of previous Africa-EU relations in the context of ACP-EU relations. For 
most of its history however, South Africa was mostly absent from that particular 
configuration. This has created a tension between the bilateralism of the EU-South 
$IULFD6WUDWHJLF3DUWQHUVKLSDQGWKHPXOWLODWHUDOLVPRIWKH(8¶VUHJLRQDODSSURDFKWR
security. 0RUHRYHUWKH(8¶VRZQLQYHVWPHQWLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDFRQWLQHQW-wide 
security architecture has meant that pragmatically, developing peace and security as 
an exclusive area of bilateralism has not been a priority despite potential entry points, 
as shown by the examples above. Rather, where the EU sees its leverage with South 
Africa is in its roles as a regional rather than bilateral partner.  
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Yet, although South Africa itself prioritises the region, when it comes to its 
relationship with the EU it still seeks to maintain that unique standing which is 
represented by bilateralism in a lot of policy areas. This seeming schism between the 
perceptions of the two actors, however, extends beyond the nature of their bilateral 
relations. With the EU using its regional approach to engage with other countries 
amenable to the regional approach but lacking the partnership it shares with South 
Africa, this might create tensions between South Africa and other Africa countries, 
and indeed, the AU itself. 
 
Thus one major unintended consequence of pursuing peace and security within the 
strategic partnership context is its potential to fragment security cooperation. This is 
assuming that the peace and security element of the strategic partnership grows 
beyond its current dormant state. But perhaps more telling is that due to the lacklustre 
actions undertaken under the auspices of the strategic partnership, if Pretoria insists 
on its bilateral nature, South Africa may be side-lined in favour of more amenable 
African partners on peace and security on the continent.  
 
South Africa has been an effective partner on dialogue and this is evidenced by the 
creation of the Dialogue Facility. But if both partners do not agree to a shared 
understanding of a regional, multilateral approach to security, this may very well be 
the extent of peace and security cooperation within the strategic partnership. While 
6RXWK$IULFD¶VUHDFKGRHVH[WHQGEH\RQd Africa, in the context of how the EU views 
its role, it may well be constrained to being a regional actor. 
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This article argues that despite a shared normative framework on security, the 
strategic partnership between the EU and South Africa excludes for the most part the 
DUHDVRISHDFHDQGVHFXULW\7KLVLVGXHWRWKH(8¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUHQJDJLQJRQLVVXHV
of peace and security as a regional good. Although South Africa is one of the core 
countries shaping the continental security agenda, this leverage is actually constrained 
by the specific context of the ten-year-old strategic partnership.  
 
For a truly strategic partnership on peace and security to thrive, South Africa should 
consider that in this area of policy, multilateralism through collaboration with African 
partners is paradoxically the best way to preserve the bilateral nature of the strategic 
partnership. It is through this that a meaningful relationship beyond trade and aid can 
be forged. Countries like Nigeria and Algeria, even without formal strategic 
partnerships, are already considered to be integral to many of the peace and security 
efforts on the continent. At the same time, the EU must put in the work of convincing 
South Africa of this way forward; otherwise, it could lose an important partner for 
security in Africa. While the 2016 EU-South Africa Summit already points towards 
this, practices of both partners between 2017 and 2027 will determine the extent to 
which this is tolerable to South Africa given its current privileged partnership.  
 
Note on contributor:  Toni Haastrup is a Lecturer in International Security at the 
University of Kent. She is also a Deputy Director of its Global Europe Centre. Her 
research centres on the practices of regional security actors and feminist 
understandings of international security practices. 
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